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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen a great deal of torture inflicted upon the
wording of the Australian Copyright Act' as it and its interpreters
struggle to come to terms with rapidly emerging technologies. The
most recent decision of the High Court on copyright, the anxiously
awaited Telstra Corp. Ltd v. Australasian Performing Right Ass'n,'
is certainly no exception. This case highlights the difficulties for
the courts in applying technologically outmoded drafting to new
developments. Unfortunately, it also demonstrates the dangerous
consequences of the judiciary being too willing to stretch the
wording of the Act to encompass activities which may appear at a
general level to be "infringing" but which were never contemplated
by the drafters of the legislation.
Consequently, the Telstra case is a strong contender for the title
of "worst intellectual property case," at least as far as cases
affecting digital technology are concerned. It opens up the
potential for communications carriers such as Telstra to be liable
for copyright infringement, where they are not responsible for
* Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Monash University, Australia.
Copyright Act, 1968.
2 Telstra Corp. v. APRA (1997) 146 A.L.R. 649.
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providing the content but merely the means of conveying that
content. In this way, the case provides a troubling precedent for
communications carriers in other on-line contexts, in particular, the
Internet.
Until the Telstra decision, it had been assumed that Internet
Service Providers and communications carriers3 would be protected
from liability for copyright infringement where they had acted
merely as a conduit for the transmission of the infringing materi-
al.4 This belief was based on the understanding that, unless the
service provider had itself initiated the distribution of the infring-
ing material, it could only be liable on the grounds of "authorising"
the infringing conduct of a third party. It had been determined in
a series of Australian decisions that the concept of "authorisation"
embodied in the Copyright Act required some element of control
over the infringing activity.5 Therefore, if service providers did not
initiate or control the distribution of the infringing material they
could not be held liable for its dissemination. Contrary to this line
of reasoning, the High Court in Telstra found a communications
provider liable for copyright infringement, albeit in the different
context of music being played over the telephone to a caller waiting
on hold, regardless of whether the infringing communication
originated from it or a third party.
If this lack of distinction were to be followed and applied in the
broader context of other on-line communications, it may have a
drastic limiting effect on the free flow of information on the
Internet as communications carriers seek to protect themselves
from liability for potentially infringing communications. Although
' The term "Internet Service Provider" refers to those who operate facilities to connect
to the Internet. They may be individuals, educational institutions or businesses. The
services they offer vary in terms of facilities provided and prices charged. Communications
carriers provide the infrastructure for carrying those services i.e. the wires and telephone
lines. In Australia, Telstra operates in both capacities. As the Telstra case did not
distinguish between these two roles, since the subject matter of the case was telephony
rather than the Internet, this article will consider the potential impact of the decision on
both forms of providers.
' It is not disputed that where the service provider had itself disseminated infringing
material it would be directly liable for that infringing conduct. See, e.g., Sega Enterprises,
Ltd. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding the service provider liable).
" Univ. of New South Wales v. Moorhouse (1975) 133 C.L.R. 1; APRA v. Jain (1990) 18
I.P.R. 663; Australian Tape Mfr. Ass'n v. Commonwealth (1993) 176 C.L.R. 480.
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the full practical ramifications of the case are yet to emerge, the
case has negative policy implications for the development of the
Internet, implications that will most probably have to be over-
turned by legislative action.
II. THE CASE
A. THE FACTS
Telstra is the largest (and until recently the only) telecommunica-
tions carrier in Australia. Australasian Performing Right Associa-
tion (APRA) is the oldest collecting society in Australia, established
to protect the public performance right of songwriters and compos-
ers and ensure that they receive remuneration for the public
performance of their works. It operates by licensing use of music
and returning the licence fees in the form of royalties to its
"members," the copyright creators.6
The case arose out of a claim by APRA that the playing of music
to callers waiting to be connected by telephone ("music on hold")
was a breach of the rights of the copyright owner. The parties
agreed that this was to be a test case and co-operated in the
preparation of the case.7
The parties stipulated that the provision of music on hold by
Telstra occurred in three ways.8 First, where a person made a
telephone call to a Telstra service centre and was placed on hold,
that person would hear music being played at the centre where the
call was placed on hold. In this case, Telstra was providing the
music heard by the caller. Secondly, where a person called various
businesses or government organisations and was placed on hold,
that person would hear music provided by the organisation or a
third party. In this case, Telstra was providing only the transmis-
sion facility for the music that was heard by the caller. Finally
where a caller is placed on hold by a subscriber to the CustomNet
6 See About APRA; An Organisational Overview, Contact Details and Info on the People
Who Make APRA Tick. (visited Mar. 20, 1998) <httpJ/www.apra.com.au>.
' It was stipulated that APRA was the owner of the copyright in the music and lyrics of
the songs which were the subject of the case. APRA v. Telstra Corp. (1993) 46 F.C.R. 131,
at 132.
' Telstra Corp. v. APRA (1997) 146 A.L.R. 649, at 651.
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service provided by Telstra. The call is diverted to a music on hold
facility located at the nearest Telstra exchange and the music was
provided by Telstra. In any of these three situations, the music
may be produced by a pre-recorded tape or compact disc or may be
a radio broadcast. In addition, in each situation the caller could be
using either a conventional telephone or a mobile phone.?
B. THE GROUNDS FOR INFRINGEMENT
In Australia, copyright is granted to owners of literary, dramatic
and musical works by section 31(1)(a) of the Copyright Act which
provides that copyright in such a work is the exclusive right to:
(i) reproduce the work in a material form;
(ii) publish the work;
(iii) perform the work in public;
(iv) broadcast the work;
(v) cause the work to be transmitted to subscribers to
a diffusion service;
(vi) make an adaptation of the work;
or do any of these acts in relation to an adaptation of
the work, except to make a further adaptation.'0
Thus, a copyright is infringed where someone does or authorises
the doing of any of these acts in relation to a work without the
licence of the owner.'
Initially APRA contended that by transmitting music on hold
played by itself or by third parties, Telstra was causing the work
to be performed in public (section 3 1(1)(a)(iii)) or broadcast (section
31(1)(a)(iv)), and that by transmitting music on hold to users of
mobile telephones it was causing the work to be transmitted to
subscribers to a diffusion service (section 31(1)(a)(v)). The issue of
performing the work in public, however, was rejected by the
9 Id.
'0 Copyright Act, 1968, s 31(lXa).
" Copyright Act, 1968, s 36(1).
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Federal Court at first instance, 12 was not raised in the Full
Federal Court proceedings, and was disregarded by the High
Court. 3 The issue for the High Court therefore was whether the
transmission of music on hold to conventional and mobile tele-
phones was an infringement of the copyright owner's right to
broadcast the work or transmit it to subscribers to a diffusion
service. Despite the Federal Court's decision in favour of Telstra
that no copyright infringement had occurred, the High Court
agreed with the ruling of the Full Federal Court by holding
unanimously, that Telstra's providing music on hold to callers from
mobile telephones infringed the broadcast right, and by majority
that Telstra infringed the owner's right to transmit material to
subscribers to a diffusion service."'
No distinction was drawn in the judgments between the situation
where Telstra itself was responsible for providing the music and
where it was merely the carrier of music made available by a third
party.
C. THE DECISIONS
1. The Diffusion Right. APRA argued that the playing of music
on hold by Telstra and/or its transmission over the telephone
service constituted a breach of the right of the copyright owner
pursuant to section 31(1)(a)(v) "to cause the work to be transmitted
to subscribers to a diffusion service." In order to determine
whether there has been a breach of this right, a court must
determine (i) whether the defendant's service is a "diffusion
service"; (ii) whether the copyrighted work is "transmitted" to a
"subscriber" to that service; and (iii) whether the alleged infringer
"caused" that transmission. 5
The meaning of these terms is further illuminated (or possibly
obscured) by the various subsections of section 26. Sub-section (1)
provides that transmission of a copyright work "to subscribers to a
diffusion service shall be ... the transmission of the work ... in
12 APRA v. Telstra Crop. (1993) 46 F.C.R. 131, at 138.
,3 Telstra Corp. v. APRA (1997) 146 A.L.R. 649, at 651.
14 Id.
'a Id. at 652.
1998]
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the course of a service of distributing broadcast or other matter
(whether provided by the person operating the service or by other
persons) over wires . . . or [other] material substance, to the
premises of subscribers to the service." 6 Sub-section (2) provides
that where a work is so transmitted "the person operating the
service shall be deemed to be the person causing the work or other
subject-matter to be so transwmitted." 7 Further, the reference to
the person operating a service of distributing broadcast or other
matter is deemed by sub-section (4) to be the person who agrees to
provide subscribers with the service, regardless of whether that
person transmits the broadcast or other matter or not." Finally,
sub-section (5) provides that where a service of distributing matter
over wires (or other material substance) is "only incidental to, or
part of, a service of transmitting telegraphic or telephonic commu-
nications" the subscriber to that service is deemed to be a subscrib-
er to the distribution service.' 9
This convoluted section, clearly dealing with technological
concepts which have rapidly become outdated, was to cause all of
the judges involved in the case serious difficulty. While as noted
by the Copyright Convergence Group in its Report of August 1994
that the provisions of section 26 are "highly technical," 0 the
section is intended to provide guidance on the scope of the diffusion
right. Yet the Court's detailed construction does little to enlighten
the modern reader regarding what is intended. As noted in the
judgments of McHugh j 2 and Kirby j, 22 it is likely that section
26 was enacted to satisfy the requirements of Article libis of the
Berne Convention and as such, intended to capture practices such
as the relaying of broadcast material to boost reception and use of
'6 Copyright Act, 1968, s 26(1) (Austl.) (Italics added).
17 s 26(2).
18 s 26(4).
19 s26(5).
20 See, Highways to Change, Copyright in the New Communications Environment, Report
of the Copyright Convergence Group, 19 (August 1994) ("The provisions of section 26 are
highly technical and their interpretation has tested the best judicial minds. Regardless of
the detailed construction of the section, it is clear that the right to transmit to subscribers
to a diffusion service is inadequate and confusing and, therefore, undesirable").
2 Telstra Corp. v. APRA (1997) 146 A.L.R. 649, at 665.
2 Id. at 688.
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a device known as a theatrephone, long vanished and forgotten.23
None of these envisaged uses was relevant to the case before the
court. Nevertheless, all of these provisions had to be considered
and applied by the courts in reaching a decision regarding the
music on hold system operated by Telstra or provided via its
facilities.
Telstra argued that the music on hold facility could not constitute
a relevant "diffusion service" because the transmission was received
by callers who were merely the beneficiaries of a facility provided
for them by others and therefore the transmissions were not made
"to the premises of subscribers." Further, they argued the music on
hold facility could not be described as a service because the callers
may not want to receive it, but are compelled to do so while waiting
on hold. APRA on the other hand contended that the transmission
of music on hold was part of the general service of telephonic
communications and a subscriber to the telephone service could be
taken to be a subscriber to the service of distributing music on
hold.
At first instance, Gummow J noted that the construction of
section 26, in particular sub-section (5), was "by no means as plain
as it should be."24 He concluded that a system primarily designed
to facilitate communication between two people "could not readily
be described as a service of distributing matter."2 5 He found that
the music was provided not for the benefit of the callers but for the
benefit of the person who had arranged for the playing of the
music. Therefore, there was no transmission to the premises of the
subscribers to the service.26
The majority in the Full Federal Court, Black CJ and Burchett
J, overturned the decision of Gummow J on the diffusion right.27
Black CJ concluded that the provision of music on hold constituted
a service, even if consumers did not appreciate the music, as it was
provided for their benefit.2 Distribution of the music took place
' See S. Ricketson, The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
1886-1986, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College, 432 (1987).
24 APRA v. Telstra Corp. (1993) 46 F.C.R. 131, at 135.
2' Id. at 137.
2 Id.
27 APRA v. Telstra Corp. (1995) 60 F.C.R. 221.
28 Id. at 225-29.
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over the telephone lines and this service was incidental to the
telephone service. Therefore, section 26(5) deems the subscriber to
the telephone service to be a subscriber to the distribution service.
He concluded that Telstra was the person operating the service of
distributing matter and therefore, through the application of
sections 26(2) and (4), deemed to be the person causing the work to
be transmitted.29 Burchett J agreed with the judgment of Black
CJ on this issue.3°
Sheppard J dissented, reasoning that the callers who dialled the
relevant number, did not do so for the purpose of hearing music
and could not relevantly be described as subscribers to the service.
He acknowledged the difficulty for the court of applying outdated,
technologically specific statutory provisions, concluding that the
drafters of the legislation could never have intended the sections to
deal with the music on hold scenario. 1
The High Court was also divided on the issue of whether there
had been an infringement of the diffusion right, with a majority
finding in favour of APRA. Gaudron and Dawson JJ, supported the
majority in the Full Federal Court, holding that the systematic
transmission of music on hold was a service of distributing
broadcast or other matter, regardless of whether callers appreciated
that service. 2 In relation to the difficult issue of who were the
subscribers to that service, they held that section 26(5) was
sufficient to identify the relevant subscribers.33 They concluded
that under section 26(5) Telstra is deemed to have agreed with
subscribers to the telephone service to provide them with a
' Id. Black CJ excluded transmission of broadcast material pursuant to the operation
of s 199(4) of the Copyright Act. Id. at 229.
30 Id. at 225-26.
"1 Id. at 232 (Sheppard, J., dissenting) (stating "It should... be said at the outset that
one would not lightly take the view that this very extensive use, albeit by new technology,
of such conventional works as lyrics and music was outside the purview of the bundle of
exclusive rights conferred on copyright owners by s 31 of the Copyright Act. Nevertheless,
if the use in question is not within the rights conferred by that Act, there will be no
infringement.").
32 Telstra Corp. v. APRA (1997) 146 A.L.R. 649.
3 Section 26(5) provides that "where a service of distributing matter over wires or over
other paths provided by a material substance is only incidental to, or part of, a service of
transmitting telegraphic or telephonic communications, a subscriber to the last mentioned
service shall be taken, for the purposes of this section, to be a subscriber to the first
mentioned service." Copyright Act, 1968, s 26(5).
404 [Vol. 5:397
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diffusion service and as a consequence of the deeming provisions in
section 26(2) and (4), Telstra was the operator of that service.34
Kirby J also held that the transmission of music on hold
constituted a diffusion service, regardless of whether callers wanted
to hear the music. He stated that the difficulties in interpreting
section 26(5) could be resolved by examining the sub-section in the
context of the fact that the Copyright Act was enacted in terms
intended to enable Australia to subscribe to the Berne Convention,
itself intended to provide broad protection to copyright creators
against dissemination of their works to the public.3 " Even though
the technology under consideration may not have been in contem-
plation at the time of the drafting of the legislation, there was still
scope to extend application of the section to such technology.
Therefore, the effect of section 26(5) is to deem subscribers to a
telephone service to be subscribers to the music on hold service. 6
Toohey J, like Sheppard J in the Full Federal Court, dissented
on the basis that the persons who received the music were not the
persons who subscribed to the diffusion service. McHugh, J.
found that because the music had not been transmitted to the
public by wireless telegraphy or similar means (i.e. broadcast)
before being transmitted to subscribers via the diffusion service, it
could not satisfy the requirement of being "broadcast or other
matter" for the purposes of section 26(1)." 8 However, as this had
not been argued by the parties, he could not decide the appeal on
this point. Rather, McHugh J, found that as section 26(5) was a
deeming provision it had to be construed strictly and on this basis
he could not conclude that Telstra had agreed to provide a diffusion
service.39
2. The Broadcast Right. Given the lack of lines and physical
connections in the use of mobile telephones, the diffusion right
could not be extended to cover the situation where music is played
Telstra Corp. v. APRA (1997) 146 A.L.R. 649, at 656.
5Id. at 685-87.
" Id.
37 Id. at 661.
' Id. at 666-669. This conclusion was drawn in part from an examination of the history
of the section, noting that the relaying of the broadcast material would have been perceived
as the type of service in respect of which the section would have principal application.
"' Id. at 669-71.
1998] 405
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to callers on hold on mobile telephones, hence the reliance on the
broadcast right contained in section 31(1)(a)(iv). The term
"broadcast" is defined by section 10(1) of the Copyright Act to mean
"to transmit by wireless telegraphy to the public."40 As a technical
point, it is clear that transmissions to mobile phones involve the
emitting of electromagnetic energy.4' It is the requirement that
the transmission be "to the public" that caused the major issue in
this aspect of the case.
Gummow J examined the operation of the mobile telephone
system in Australia and the strict privacy requirements under the
relevant telecommunications statutes. He concluded that the
system operated by Telstra is essentially one "of confidential
communication between two people." 2 He stated that to hold any
communication of a copyright work during this private communica-
tion a broadcast to the public would be to distort the language of
the broadcast provisions.43
In the Full Federal Court, all three judges were in agreement
that although telephone calls are essentially private in character
regardless of whether they are made for domestic or business
purposes, when applying section 31(1)(a)(iv), the relevant consider-
ation is whether the broadcast is to the copyright owner's public."
As the playing of music on hold generally occurs in a situation
which is for business purposes, it could legitimately be considered
as a use which the copyright owner could regard as his or hers to
control.
The High Court was also unanimous on the issue of infringement
of the broadcast right where copyright works were heard by callers
using the mobile telephone network.4" The court examined the
historical development of the interpretation of the phrase "to the
public," looking at the development of the concept of the copyright
owner's public.4" Dawson and Gaudron JJ, with whom Toohey
'o 'Wireless telegraphy" is defined as "the emitting or receiving, otherwise than over a
path that is provided by a material substance, of electromagnetic energy." Copyright Act,
1968, s 10(1).
41 APRA v. Telstra Corp. (1993) 46 F.C.R. 131, at 141.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 144.
U APRA v. Telstra Corp. (1995) 60 F.C.R. 221.
Telstra Corp. v. APRA (1997) 146 A.L.R. 649.
46Id.
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and McHugh JJ agreed, rejected analysis on the basis of whether
the audience of the music would be prepared to pay to hear the
performance, looking rather at the willingness of the businesses
who arranged for the music on hold service to be provided to callers
to pay for that service.47 "Callers on hold constitute the copyright
owner's public, not because they themselves would be prepared to
pay to hear the music, but because others are prepared to bear the
cost of them having the facility."' In reaching this conclusion,
Dawson and Gaudron JJ noted that such an approach was brought
about by the development of more technologically advanced forms
of communication and the emergence of sophisticated business and
marketing techniques. 9 Kirby J also agreed that the transmis-
sion of music on hold could be said to be a transmission to the
copyright owner's public.5"
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION-THE INTERNET
In applying the existing provisions of the Copyright Act to the
expanding and ever changing world of communications technology,
the judges faced the difficult challenge of interpreting and applying
the tortured wording of section 26. That section reflects an era of
technology long gone and it is now generally accepted by law
reform bodies, such as the Copyright Convergence Group, that the
section should be repealed.5 Faced with this relic from the past,
the court failed to look to the future implications of the decision.
Clearly, the finding that Telstra could be liable for copyright
infringement in circumstances where it may not have been in a
position to control the content of the transmission has ramifications
for other forms of on-line communication. As noted above, no
distinction was drawn between Telstra's role as a content provider,
i.e. where it actually provided the music being heard and where it
merely operated as a carrier with the music being played by a third
party, but carried over Telstra's lines. Indeed, Dawson and
47 Id.
4 Id. at 659.
49 Id.
go Id.
" See Highways to Change: Copyright in the New Communications Environment, Report
of the Copyright Convergence Group, 28 (August 1994).
1998] 407
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Gaudron JJ of the High Court explicitly state that this factor is
"irrelevant".52 This is despite the fact that section 26(2), in
addition to providing that the person operating the service shall be
deemed to be the person causing the work to be transmitted, states
that "no person other than the person operating the service shall
be deemed to be causing the work.., to be so transmitted, whether
or not he provides any facilitiei for the transmission." "
It is this failure to distinguish between the roles of content
providers and content carriers that represents the most troubling
aspect of the decision. The parallels between the Internet and the
transmission of copyright material via the music on hold service are
clear. Each involves the distribution of matter over telephone lines
or the distribution of matter incidental to a telephone service, given
the broad interpretation of section 26 by the majority of judges in
Telstra. Kirby J was the only one to directly address the potential
consequences of this aspect of the decision, with the following
concluding remarks to his judgment:
It has been suggested that the foregoing conclu-
sions could have significant consequences for other
information technologies-including facsimile servic-
es, video conferencing and data transmission. In
particular, it has been argued that telecommunica-
tions carriers and perhaps even internet service
providers could potentially become liable as a result
of internet users' downloading works which are
protected by copyright. Clearly, such issues go
beyond the scope of this appeal. They were not
developed in the arguments of the parties. However,
the parliament may need to consider these ques-
tions-and others arising-and to formulate a
legislative response to them. They cannot be solved,
but have not been overlooked, by me.'
62 Telstra Corp. v. APRA (1997) 146 A.L.R. 649.
"Copyright Act, 1968, s 26(2).
Telstra Corp. v. APRA (1997) 146 A.L.R. 649, at 695 (citing Loughlan, Music on Hold:
The Case of Copyright and the Telephone. Telstra Corp. Ltd. v. Australasian Performing
Rights Association Ltd. (1996) 18 SYDNEY L. REV. 342, at 347-8).
408 [Vol. 5:397
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Thus, Kirby J alone flags, but does not attempt to resolve, the
major problem created by the decision in this case.
Until now, it has largely been assumed that on-line service
providers will be liable for copyright infringement only where they
are acting as content providers or could be said to have authorised
an infringing communication. In particular, communications
carriers such as Telstra have been perceived as immune from
liability because they merely provide the physical infrastructure
over which the communications are transferred. 5 The provision
of service facilities for communication has not been perceived as
sufficient to constitute authorisation within the meaning of section
36.56
The concept of authorisation in a digital context has not been
judicially considered in Australia. The classic formulation is that
the word "authorise" should be interpreted as meaning sanction,
approve, countenance and permit." Later decisions have referred
to this as the ability of the defendant to "control" the actual
infringing use.5" While there is no Australian authority on point,
commentators have uniformly suggested that the Australian
concept of"authorisation" should operate in an on-line environment
as it does in U.S. cases such as Religious Technology Center v.
Netcom On-Line Communications Services.5 9
In that case, the Church of Scientology sought unsuccessfully to
make the operator of a bulletin board service and a service
provider, Netcom, liable for the transmission of allegedly infringing
messages to the "alt.religion.scientology" newsgroup posted by a
third party. The court concluded with respect to the service
"See, Report to the Federal Minister for Communications and the Arts, (30 June 1996)
(visited May 8, 1998) <http:J/www.dca.gov.au/aba/olsrprt.htm> (summarizing an investigation
of Australian Broadcasting Authority, into the content of on-line services).
"6 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
'7 University of New South Wales v. Moorhouse (1975) 133 C.L.R. 1, at 13 (Gibbs J.,
joining the majority in holding that a copyright infringement declaration was wrongly made).
" APRA v. Jain (1990) 18 I.P.R. 663; Australian Tape Manufacturers Association v.
Commonwealth (1993) 176 C.L.R. 480.
" 907 F. Supp. 1361, 33 I.P.R. 132 (N.D. Cal. 1995). See, Stephen Loughnan, Service
Provider Liability for User Copyright Infringement on the Internet (1997) 8 AUSTRALIAN
INTELL. PROP. J. 18, and Melissa de Zwart, Controlling Content on the Information
Superhighway: The Liability of Internet Service Providers for Copyright Infringement (1997)
5 CURRENT COM. L. 1 (analyzing Internet Service Provider liability under U.S. case law).
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provider, that its role was similar to that of the owner of a
photocopying machine who allows members of the public to make
copies on it." Netcom played no positive role in the distribution
of the allegedly infringing posting, the message merely being
transmitted via its network service, and there was nothing to
distinguish it from the other computers involved in the distribution
of the message. Similarly, the court found that there was no
evidence that the operator of the bulletin board service had played
any affirmative role in the distribution of the posting as any copies
made were the result of automatic commands in the bulletin board
system.6'
The opposite result was reached in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
Frena62 where the defendant operated a bulletin board accessible
to subscribers for a fee. Subscribers were able to upload images
onto the bulletin board and it was found that the images available
included some one hundred and seventy images copied from
Playboy publications. 3 The operator was found liable in respect
of copyright infringement, regardless of the fact he had not himself
placed the images on the bulletin board. The facts of this case
demonstrated that Frena was a hands-on operator of the board and
should have been aware of the copyright notices attached to many
of the postings.' Even so, the result has been criticised as overly
strict.6
5
The decision in Telstra, therefore, represents a departure from
the narrow concept of control as applied in existing U.S. authority
and is disappointing for its failure to confront the issue of authoris-
ation which may have lead to a vastly different result with respect
to the situation where Telstra was merely providing the facilities
for conveying the transmission. Liability of Telstra in its role as a
common carrier was recognised as an undesirable outcome by the
6 Id. at 1368.
61 Id. at 1369.
6 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fl. 1993).
6 Id. at 1556-57.
4 Id.
6See Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications Services, 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1370 n.16 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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Copyright Convergence Group in its 1994 Report.66 The decision
leaves the way open for service providers to be found directly liable
for the transmission of material supplied by third parties. The
need for resolution of these issues may not go unsatisfied however.
It was announced in June 1997 that APRA, heartened by its victory
in Telstra, had commenced an action against OzEmail, one of
Australia's largest Internet Service Providers, claiming that by
transmitting music to its subscribers, it was in breach of the
distribution right. It is to be hoped that a clearer line will be
drawn in this case between provision of content and provision of
transmission facilities.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
It is likely that the provisions which caused the High Court to
perform amazing feats of interpretive acrobatics in Telstra will be
replaced in the near future with the proposed introduction of two
new copyrights in Australia-a broadly based technology neutral
transmission right, and a right of making available to the public.6
These rights are intended to strengthen the rights of copyright
owners in the light of the emergence of digital technology and are
designed to enable Australia to become a signatory to the two new
World Intellectual Property Organisation Treaties concluded in
December 1996: the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO
Performance and Phonograms Treaty.' The new transmission
right would replace both the diffusion and broadcasting rights that
were at issue in Telstra, providing for transmission both by wired
and non-wired means in a non-interactive manner, i.e. the trans-
mission of signals to a receiving device at a time chosen by the
person making the transmission. 9 The right of making available
Highways to Change, Copyright in the New Communications Environment, Report of
the Copyright Convergence Group (20 August 1994) ("if the decision [in APRA v Telstra Corp.]
at first instance is overturned, it is possible that Teistra, in its capacity as a common carrier,
could be responsible for the content of the services provided by means of its infrastructure.
This too is an undesirable outcome.").
6
' See Discussion Paper, Copyright Reform and the Digital Agenda Proposed Transmission
Right, Right of Making Available and Encorcement Measures (July 1997) (visited May 8,
1998) <http:/www.dca.gov.au/pubs/digital.html> (hereinafter "Discussion Paper").
e Discussion Paper, supra note 67, at paragraph 1.1.
Discussion Paper, supra note 67, at Part 4.
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would extend to interactive services, where material is provided on-
line and can be accessed at a time chosen by the receiver."0 This
will of course remove the enormous difficulties faced by each of the
courts in interpreting section 26.
In considering the ramifications of Telstra v. APRA Corp. for
communications carriers, it should be noted that the Discussion
Paper, which was released prior to the handing down of the High
Court's decision in the case, sought submissions on the issue of the
copyright liability of communication carriers and other on-line
service providers. The Discussion Paper concluded that such issues
should generally be left to be decided according to existing princi-
ples of direct infringement and authorisation.7 In relation to
communications carriers, i.e. providers of physical transmission
facilities only, the Discussion Paper notes that the Agreed State-
ments adopted by the WIPO Diplomatic Conference on the WIPO
Treaties included Article 8, which provides:
It is understood that the mere provision of physical
facilities for enabling or making a communication
does not in itself amount to communication within
the meaning of this Treaty or the Berne Conven-
tion.72
This may permit communications providers such as Telstra and
Optus, to be excluded from liability where all they are providing is
the physical facilities for transmission rather than the content.73
The alternative approach, represented by the decision in Telstra,
may be to discourage on-line service providers from entering the
market, limiting Australian access to the Information Highway,
and raising user costs.74 Further, over-regulation may have a
7o Discussion Paper, supra note 67, at Part 4. It is possible that the two rights may be
merged into a single "communication to the public" right following submissions received in
response to the Discussion Paper.
T' Discussion Paper, supra note 67, at para 4.72.
72 Discussion paper, supra note 67, at para. 3.19 (citing the World Intellectual Property
Organisation Copyright Treaty, Dec., 1996, art. 8).
7 3 Discussion Paper, supra note 67, at para 3.25.
7' See F. Macmillan and Blakeney, The Copyright Liability of Communications Carriers
THE JOURNAL OF INFORMATION LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, (1997) (visited May 8, 1998)
<httpJ/elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/commsreg/97-3macm/>.
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"chilling" effect on free speech, casting the on-line service provider
in the role of the copyright police and removing the need for
copyright owners themselves to be particularly vigilant.
As Whyte DJ recognised in Netcom, to impose liability on the
service provider is to impose liability on the wrong party, merely
because that party is accessible and readily identifiable. He stated
that where there is a primary infringer directly liable for the
infringing act,
it does not make sense to adopt a rule that could
lead to the liability of countless parties whose role in
the infringement is nothing more than setting up
and operating a system that is necessary for the
functioning of the Internet.75
For this reason, the failure of the courts in Telstra to distinguish
the situation where the service provider was only providing the
physical means of conveying the infringing material, leads to the
creation of a disturbing precedent for on-line service providers.
V. CONCLUSION-A BAD CASE
In the Telstra case, the various judges were confronted with some
of the more arcane and convoluted sections of a Copyright Act that
is becoming increasingly irrelevant. The court was yet again
expected to fit a square peg into a round hole by applying sections
that use terms that no longer have any practical relevance,
particularly with regard to the diffusion right, interpreting sections
whose real meaning has become obscured by technological evolu-
tion. However, in being willing to extend the application of the
sections in this way the High Court has created a problem with
respect to the issue of direct liability of communication providers.
In particular, it represents a dangerous precedent if applied
indiscriminately to the latest form of wired communication-the
Internet. It is hoped that legislative measures will soon be
undertaken to overcome the difficulties created by this precedent,
75 Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications Services, 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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a clear candidate for the worst intellectual property opinion ever
written because of its ability to conjure into existence a service, a
subscriber, and a provider of a service that never truly existed.
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